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Efeitos de estrate´gias de distribuic¸a˜o de recompensas e perfis de perseveranc¸a na
dinaˆmica de coalizo˜es baseadas em agentes
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Abstract: In a conventional political system, leaders decide how to distribute benefits to the population and
coalitions can emerge when other individuals support the candidates. This work intends to analyze how different
leader strategies and individual profiles affect the way coalitions are formed and rewards are shared. Using
agent-based simulation, we simulated a model in which individuals of three different perseverance profiles
(patient, intermediate and impatient) eventually decide to be part of coalitions by supporting certain leaders
when aiming to maximize their own earnings. Leaders can follow one of three different strategies to share
rewards: altruistic, intermediate and egoistic. The results show that egoistic leaders stimulate the competition for
rewards and the formation of coalitions, causing greater inequalities, while impatient individuals also promote
more instability and lead to a higher concentration of rewards.
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Resumo: Em um sistema polı´tico convencional, lı´deres decidem como distribuir benefı´cios a` populac¸a˜o
e coalizo˜es podem emergir quando outros indivı´duos apoiam os candidatos. Este trabalho se propo˜e a
analisar como diferentes estrate´gias de lı´deres e perfis de indivı´duos afetam a maneira como coalizo˜es
sa˜o formadas e recompensas sa˜o compartilhadas. Usando simulac¸a˜o baseada em agentes, no´s simu-
lamos um modelo no qual indivı´duos de treˆs diferentes perfis de perseveranc¸a (paciente, intermedia´rio
e impaciente) eventualmente decidem fazer parte de coalizo˜es apoiando certos lı´deres com o objetivo
de maximizar seus pro´prios ganhos. Lı´deres podem seguir uma dentre treˆs diferentes estrate´gias para
compartilhar recompensas: altruı´sta, intermedia´ria e egoı´sta. Os resultados mostram que lı´deres egoı´stas
estimulam a competic¸a˜o por recompensas e a formac¸a˜o de coalizo˜es, causando mais desigualdade, e in-
divı´duos impacientes tambe´m promovem mais instabilidade e levam a uma maior concentrac¸a˜o de recompensas.
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1. Introduction
In experimental economics, prosocial attitudes have been stud-
ied in the Public Goods Game [1]. In its standard version, an
equal amount of coins is given to the players at the beginning
of the game. Then, in each round, every player confidentially
decides how many coins, if any, he wants to put in a public
pot. At the end of the round, the number of coins contained
in the pot is increased by a gain factor between one and the
number of players, representing a cooperation bonus, and the
resulting amount is equally shared among all players. Col-
lectively, the best situation is when every player offers all his
coins to the public pot, which maximizes the total amount
of coins available in the system. In contrast, from an indi-
vidual perspective, a single player gets the highest gain by
not offering any coins to the pot. So, considering that it is
not possible to make agreements nor to retaliate, since the
decision of each player is confidential, the game theoretically
ends without any player putting coins in the pot. However,
experiments presented in [1] indicate that in real life initially
there may be some level of cooperation. They show that in the
first rounds some players tend to put coins in the pot, while
others eventually also decide to cooperate when they notice
that someone is doing so. Nevertheless, such behavior ends
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up disappearing after a certain number of rounds.
Burger and Kolstad [2] propose a scenario in which form-
ing coalitions is allowed in the context of the Public Goods
Game. In such a scenario, the players choose, in each round,
to be part or not of a coalition before deciding how many
coins to contribute. Each member of a coalition informs his
preference about contributing or not to the public goods and
all members of the coalition follow the decision of the major-
ity. Finally, the amount collected is equally divided among all
players. In this way, being part of a coalition reduces the risk
of the contribution, since a member of a coalition contributes
to the public goods only when the other members do the same.
However, it diminishes the autonomy of a player, since his
action is dependent on the majority decision. Moreover, the
mentioned work includes a case in which there is a degree of
uncertainty about receiving rewards. In this case, there is a pre-
viously known probability that no reward will be distributed
in a round, but the expected overall return is maintained. The
study experimentally evaluates the impact of coalition forma-
tion and uncertainty on contribution patterns and also relates
the sizes of coalitions to the experimental settings. Their
results show that: (i) contributions to the public goods are
increased when forming coalitions is allowed; (ii) coalitions
are larger as the potential individual reward increases; and (iii)
contributions tend to decrease with increasing uncertainty.
Hamman et al. [3] also analyze scenarios in which coali-
tions may be formed, but in their experiments a leader of a
coalition is responsible for deciding each member’s contribu-
tion. In the same way as in the standard model, the amount
collected is equally divided among all players. Basically, the
study compares three scenarios: (i) a decentralized one, in
which players voluntarily decide how much to contribute; (ii)
a centralized one, in which players have to select a leader
who is in charge of deciding how much each player should
contribute in that round; and (iii) a flexible one, in which
every player can choose to be part of a coalition, delegating
his decision to a leader, or not. The study also evaluates the
impact of allowing communication between players in each
of the three scenarios. The results obtained in this work show
that: (i) the decentralized scenario leads to low collective
efficiency since contributions tend to decrease dramatically,
even though performance is improved when communication is
allowed; (ii) the centralized scenario is the most efficient one,
since players tend to select leaders who maximize collective
contributions and avoid selfish leaders; and (iii) the flexible
scenario is efficient only when communication is allowed,
facilitating cooperation between players, thus fostering trust
and stimulating the formation of coalitions.
On the other hand, there are two main characteristics that
differ the standard Public Goods Game from an ordinary polit-
ical system: in reality, people usually have to pay mandatory
taxes, avoiding the free-rider problem. Moreover, political
representatives are in charge of administering the public goods
and have to decide, at least partially, which interests, groups
and regions to serve and which goods and services to offer,
usually leading to an unequal distribution of benefits. Even if
such real system prevents people from deciding not to offer
public contributions, on the other hand certain individuals, ex-
pecting some kind of benefit in the future, can form coalitions
to fund the campaign of candidates for political offices. This
kind of strategy may result in uneven sharing of benefits [4],
so that political representatives serve only restricted parts of
the population.
Our proposal is to develop and simulate a simplified model
of such an ordinary political system. The proposed model
is inspired in the Public Goods Game, but also consider the
main characteristics of real political systems. In our work,
we consider a society composed of individuals who seek to
maximize their profits, and may eventually support certain
leaders by forming or joining coalitions. In each cycle of a
simulation, a leader from one of the coalitions becomes the
political representative of that round and has the role of dis-
tributing rewards among all the individuals. We also consider
that leaders can follow different strategies to distribute re-
wards and individuals can have distinct perseverance profiles,
which are related to their expectations about rewards.
In such a context, the purpose of this work is to analyze
the effects of different combinations of leader welfare dis-
tribution strategies and individual perseverance profiles on
coalition dynamics and reward sharing. In other words, we
aim to answer the following question: how different leader
strategies and individual perseverance profiles affect the dy-
namics of coalitions and the distribution of rewards? So, we
expect that, on one hand, the more leaders prioritize their own
coalitions, the stronger the competition for rewards, leading
to the formation of large coalitions. On the other hand, the
higher the expectations of individuals, the greater the tendency
for concentration of rewards, increasing inequality.
Our work offers an alternative approach that can help
to understand the nature of some structural shortcomings of
current political systems. On one hand, the results obtained
could guide the definition of new regulations to increase the
efficiency of the systems. On the other hand, such results
could also guide people both to choose better leaders and
understand the importance of more collaborative behaviors.
In section 2, we briefly introduce agent-based coalitions.
We then present our model in Section 3, followed by our
experimental results in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we
present our conclusions and further work.
2. Agent-based Coalitions
Agents have an incentive to form coalitions when cooperating
with each other may be more advantageous than acting alone
[5]. Since each member decides to remain in the coalition
based on its rewards, the coalition stability depends on how
the benefits are shared. Theoretically, the reward of a member
should be defined based on his effective contribution to the
entire coalition [6] and the optimal solution for such a problem
is known as the Shapley Value. Thus, forming a coalition
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would, ideally, only make sense if the collective benefits are
greater than the combined individual earnings of its members.
Nardin et al. [7] show an interesting model involving
agent-based coalitions in which the agents are arranged in a
grid and compete for earnings. Each agent keeps track of its
neighbors’ gains and try to get better rewards by joining or
forming coalitions with those neighbors that get more benefits.
Eventually, an agent with good performance becomes leader
of a coalition, whose role is to collect the rewards of all
members and redistribute them equally after charging a fee
for the task.
Since it is subjective to determine the effective contribu-
tion of an agent to a coalition, as well as its perception about
the fairness of its rewards, generally it is only possible to
estimate the Shapley Value. Thus, if a leader is in charge
of sharing rewards among coalition members, such a leader
should try to do so in a way that keeps the coalition cohesive.
To the best of our knowledge, there are few works that
use agent-based coalitions and simulation in the context of
political organization, dynamics of parties, election of rep-
resentatives, public investments or social inequality. Muis
[8] simulates an agent-based model of party competition and
validates the results using past data on Dutch party compe-
tition. Valkering et al. [9] propose an agent-based game for
modeling cultural and behavioral change in the context of
water management and they use the concept of coalition to
model groups of different positions on water policies.
In [10], Schreiber simulates the dynamics of political par-
ties using coalitions in an agent-based model. At each iter-
ation, agents seek to form coalitions with others of similar
political positions until they achieve a majority. Although the
political position of a coalition represents the average posi-
tions of its members, it can be altered to attract new members,
but whenever a member does not consider himself represented
by his coalition anymore, he may leave it. The work shows
that using such a simple set of rules is possible to have re-
sults similar to those presented in the classic models of party
dynamics.
In Ludescher and Sichman [11], we have presented the
preliminary results of our work. We built and simulated an
agent-based model in which the individuals sought to maxi-
mize their earnings by participating or not in coalitions. Three
different leader strategies were considered: altruistic leaders
distributed rewards more equally, while egoistic ones offered
greater rewards for their coalitions, and finally the intermedi-
ate leaders had a in-between strategy. The results showed that
egoistic leaders stimulate the formation of more coalitions
and cause more instability.
In the sequence, we present an enhanced formulation of
this model, where we consider not only different leader strate-
gies, but also individual perseverance profiles.
3. Model
Using agent-based simulation techniques [12], we built and
simulated a model in which a network of agents represents
a society of individuals. Initially, all agents receive an equal
amount of resources, or capital, which can be used both to
pay a mandatory tax and to eventually fund a leader. In every
round, individuals interact with each other, leaders emerge
(any individual can become a leader) and coalitions are formed.
One of the coalitions is then declared the winner of the round
and its leader becomes the political representative. As such,
he is in charge of collecting taxes, increasing the amount col-
lected by a gain factor and deciding how to share the final
amount among the population. At the end of a round, individ-
uals evaluate their rewards, update their trust on their leaders
and decide, based on their satisfaction, whether they should
remain in their current coalition or enter in a new and different
one.
3.1 Scenario
A scale-free network [13] is used to link the individuals. In
this type of network, the probability of a node to receive a
new connection is proportional to the number of connections
it already has, causing many nodes to have few connections
while a few nodes have many (hubs). We selected this type of
network to our model because it has a structure similar to real
social networks. We chose a well-known method to set the
network, based on the Baraba´si-Albert model [14], as it is one
of the most widely used methods for forming such networks
and is relatively simple to implement.
3.2 Gain Factor
Likewise the Public Goods Game [1], our model also uses
a gain factor to increase the amount collected by taxes, rep-
resenting the gain generated through cooperation. We also
attribute different gain factors to different individuals, since
we can assume that each leader has a distinct ability to admin-
ister the public goods.
3.3 Strategies and Profiles
In our model we defined two roles: the leader and the individ-
ual. On one hand, a leader role is related to what strategy he
will follow to distribute rewards if he becomes a political rep-
resentative, as explained in [11]. Such a strategy is modeled as
a reward factor that determines how much of the total amount
the leader is willing to offer for his own coalition members.
In this model, three different leader distribution strategies are
considered: (i) egoistic, who offers more benefits for his own
coalition members; (ii) altruistic, who distributes the benefits
more equally; and (iii) intermediate, who uses a in-between
strategy.
On the other hand, an individual profile is related to how
much reward an individual expects to receive and how many
rounds he is willing to support a coalition while waiting for
any greater rewards. In this way, we defined three different
individual perseverance profiles: (i) impatient, who expects to
receive greater rewards faster; (ii) patient, who can wait longer
for better rewards; and (iii) intermediate, whose perseverance
falls between both previous ones.
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3.4 Simulation Cycle
The simulation executes several rounds of a main cycle, com-
posed by five steps, as shown in Pseudo-algorithm 1. Each of
those steps is detailed in the next subsections.
Algorithm 1 Agent-Based Coalition Simulation
Require: Simulation parameters
1: while end of simulation is not reached do
2: Forming coalitions
3: Investing in coalitions
4: Defining the winning coalition
5: Administration of the chosen representative
6: Evaluating rewards
7: end while
3.4.1 Forming coalitions
Pseudo-algorithm 2 illustrates the first step. Based on certain
probability (probLeader), some individuals initially express
interest in running for leaders. The chance of someone to
be interested to run decreases as the number of coalitions in-
crease, since opportunities diminish as competition increases.
Based on another probability (probCoalition), each individual
then decides whether to seek a coalition or not. In case the
individual decides to seek, he randomly looks for a neigh-
bor who belongs to a coalition or who wants to be a leader;
otherwise, he remains independent in that round. Once in
a coalition, the individual’s trust in his new leader is initial-
ized to a default value. Additionally, trust values on previous
leaders of previous rounds are not reset, which means that an
individual does not accept having a leader in whom he does
not trust anymore.
Algorithm 2 Forming coalitions
Require: Probability of wanting to be a leader (probLeader),
probability of being interested in joining a coalition (prob-
Coalition)
1: for all individuals do
2: ApplyForLeadershipOrNot(probLeader)
3: end for
4: for all individuals do
5: if InterestedInJoiningACoalition(probCoalition) then
6: listOfNeighbors = ∅ . list of neighbors that
belong to some coalition or who want to be leaders
7: for all neighbors do
8: if BelongsToACoalition() or WantsTo-
BeALeader() then
9: listOfNeighbors.Add(neighbor)
10: end if
11: end for
12: neighbor = RandomlyPicksOne(listOfNeighbors)
13: JoinOrFormACoalitionWith(neighbor)
14: end if
15: end for
3.4.2 Investing in coalitions
In the following step, every coalition member invests a cer-
tain percentage of his available capital in his coalition, as
illustrated in Pseudo-algorithm 3. Depending on whether
the individual gets satisfied or not with the rewards received,
he can, respectively, increase or decrease the value of the
investment, as detailed in subsection 3.4.5.
Algorithm 3 Investing in coalitions
Require: Percentage of capital to invest (%capital)
1: for all coalition members do
2: investment = %capital × availableCapital
3: InvestInCoalition(investment)
4: end for
3.4.3 Defining the winning coalition
The likelihood for a coalition to win a round is given by the
amount of received investment divided by the total investment
in all coalitions, as shown in Pseudo-algorithm 4. This is
analogous to a simplified scenario where the chance of a
political campaign to succeed is to some extent proportional
to how much investment it has received. So, the leader of the
winning coalition becomes the political representative of that
round.
Algorithm 4 Defining the winning coalition
Require: Total investment in all coalitions (totalInvestment)
1: drawnNumber = Random(0, totalInvestment)
2: partialValue = 0
3: for all coalitions do
4: partialValue = partialValue + coalitionInvestment
5: if partialValue > drawnNumber then
6: winningCoalition = coalition
7: break
8: end if
9: end for
3.4.4 Administration of the chosen representative
In this step, the leader initially collects a parameterized tax
(taxCollected), which is set up before the simulation starts
(see subsection 4.1). The leader then multiplies the amount ob-
tained by his own gain factor, resulting in the final value of the
rewards to be shared. Depending on his strategy, he then de-
fines how much of the total amount will be awarded to his own
coalition and distributes it proportionally to the investment of
each member. Finally, the remaining amount is distributed
equally to the rest of the population, which includes mem-
bers of other coalitions and independent individuals. This
procedure is detailed in Pseudo-algorithm 5.
3.4.5 Evaluating rewards
The rewards are evaluated by each individual, as presented in
Pseudo-algorithm 6.
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Algorithm 5 Administration of the chosen representative
Require: Amount of tax collected (taxCollected)
1: for leader of the winning coalition do
2: totalReward = gainFactor × taxCollected
3: winningCoalitionReward = rewardFactor × totalRe-
ward . the reward factor depends on the leader
strategy
4: othersReward = totalReward - winningCoalitionRe-
ward
5: for all winning coalition members do
6: memberReward = memberInvestment ÷ winning-
CoalitionInvestment × winningCoalitionReward
7: Send(reward)
8: end for
9: n = population - winningCoalitionMembers . n is the
number of other individuals
10: for all other individuals do
11: reward = othersReward ÷ n
12: Send(reward)
13: end for
14: end for
This evaluation takes into account both its relation to the
winning coalition and its perseverance profile, which defines a
satisfaction threshold. Patient individuals accept lower returns
than impatient ones, and impatient individuals decrease their
trust in the leaders faster than patient ones. This procedure
occurs as follows:
• Members of the winning coalition compare the reward
received with their accumulated investment in the coali-
tion. If a member gets satisfied, his trust in the leader
increases, otherwise, it drastically decreases. If the trust
falls below his profile threshold, the individual leaves
the coalition;
• Members of other coalitions decrease the trust in their
respective leaders. Again, if the trust falls below his
profile threshold, the individual leaves the coalition;
• Independent individuals evaluate their rewards. The
degree of satisfaction of an independent individual de-
pends on its individual profile. If he gets satisfied, the
probability of the individual wanting to form or join
a coalition in the next round decreases, otherwise, it
increases.
4. Experiments
We used the Repast1 agent-based simulation tool [15] and the
ReLogo programming language [16] to implement the model.
4.1 Description
The experiments were conducted with the objective of ana-
lyzing the impact of different leader and individual profiles
1https://repast.github.io/
Algorithm 6 Evaluating rewards
Require: Satisfaction threshold (threshold), trust threshold
(trustThreshold)
Output: Percentage of capital to invest (%capital), probabil-
ity of being interested in joining a coalition (probCoali-
tion)
1: for all individuals do
2: if member of the winning coalition then
3: if reward ÷ accumulatedInvestment > threshold
then
4: IncreaseTrustInLeader(profile)
5: %capital = IncreaseInvestmentInCoalition()
6: else
7: DecreaseTrustInLeader(profile)
8: %capital = DecreaseInvestmentInCoalition()
9: end if
10: if trustInLeader < trustThreshold then
11: LeaveCoalition()
12: end if
13: else if member of another coalition then
14: DecreaseTrustInLeader(profile)
15: if trustInLeader < trustThreshold then
16: LeaveCoalition()
17: end if
18: else if independent individual then
19: if reward ÷ taxPaid > threshold then
20: probCoalition = DecreaseProbCoali-
tion(profile)
21: else
22: probCoalition = IncreaseProbCoali-
tion(profile)
23: end if
24: end if
25: end for
on system’s dynamics. For this, as shown in Table 1, we de-
fined 16 experiment settings by combining 4 different leader
strategy configurations with 4 different individual profile con-
figurations. In both cases, the 4 configurations included each
of the three profiles separately and a fourth one that mixed
the three profiles in equal proportion. Moreover, as indicated
in Table 2, every experiment was run for 1000 rounds and
included 1000 individuals, each of whom received an initial
capital of 1000 at the beginning and had to pay 1 of tax every
round. Each experiment setting was repeated 30 times, total-
ing 480 experiments. We present in the sequence the average
and the standard deviation of the obtained results for each
setting.
4.2 Analysis of Results
We analyzed the results in two different dimensions. First, we
made a temporal analysis based on data collected during each
simulation setting. This analysis helped to verify the evolution
of some global variables, like the number of coalitions and
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Table 1. Experiment Settings
Setting Leader Strategy Individual Profile
#1 Altruistic Patient
#2 Altruistic Intermediate
#3 Altruistic Impatient
#4 Altruistic Mixed
#5 Intermediate Patient
#6 Intermediate Intermediate
#7 Intermediate Impatient
#8 Intermediate Mixed
#9 Egoistic Patient
#10 Egoistic Intermediate
#11 Egoistic Impatient
#12 Egoistic Mixed
#13 Mixed Patient
#14 Mixed Intermediate
#15 Mixed Impatient
#16 Mixed Mixed
Table 2. Simulation Parameters
Number of rounds per experiment 1000
Number of individuals per experiment 1000
Initial capital per individual 1000
Individual tax per round 1
Number of experiments for each setting 30
coalition members, the amount of investments in coalitions
and the average capital available. We then performed a dis-
tribution analysis of both capital among the population and
members among the coalitions based on data collected at the
end of each simulation setting. Such analyses are described
in the following subsections. The tables presented show the
means and standard deviations for each experiment setting.
The graphics, in turn, show the evolution of the variables ei-
ther for each leader strategy or for each perseverance profile,
while fixing the other profile type to a certain value. In most
graphics, the line corresponding to mixed strategies/profiles
has been suppressed for ease of viewing, highlighting the
differences between the three strategies/profiles separately.
4.3 Temporal Analysis
Table 3 presents the average number of coalitions for each
experiment setting. It shows a clear pattern in which more
coalitions are formed in the presence of altruistic leaders and
patient individuals, as it can also be seen in Figures 1 and 2.
However, Table 4 shows that the total number of coalition
members is much higher in scenarios with egoistic and also
intermediate leaders, as illustrated in Figure 3, decreasing in
the presence of impatient individuals, as shown in Figure 4.
This occurs because, on one hand, altruistic leaders do not of-
fer enough incentive to retain the members of their coalitions,
leading individuals to move from one coalition to another.
This results in a higher number of coalitions, but also in a
lower number of individuals interested in joining coalitions.
On the other hand, coalitions led by egoistic leaders tend to be
much larger, because they offer greater benefits to their mem-
bers. Furthermore, impatient individuals are more difficult
to satisfy, which explains why both the number of coalitions
and the number of coalition members are lower in scenarios
with them. We can also observe that in cases with mixed
profiles, the results are relatively close to those obtained in
scenarios with intermediate profiles. More specifically, in the
case of mixed leader strategies, the egoistic strategy seems to
exert a little more influence on the results, probably because
individuals tend to prefer egoistic leaders if they are available.
Table 3. Number of Coalitions
Individual Leader Strategy
Profile Altruist Intermed. Egoist Mixed
Patient 27±7 15±5 12±3 13±4
Intermed. 22±7 13±3 11±3 12±3
Impatient 16±7 10±2 9±2 10±2
Mixed 24±8 14±3 13±3 13±3
Figure 1. Number of Coalitions Per Leader Strategy (settings
#1, #5 and #9)
Figure 2. Number of Coalitions Per Individual Profile
(settings #1, #2 and #3)
In addition, we can then observe the average number of
members per coalition presented in Table 5, which can be
obtained by dividing the values of Table 4 by those of Ta-
ble 3. Figures 5 and 6 also show the number of members per
coalition, respectively for each leader strategy and for each
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Table 4. Number of Coalition Members
Individual Leader Strategy
Profile Altruist Intermed. Egoist Mixed
Patient 200 447 474 463
±87 ±72 ±58 ±65
Intermed. 239 376 396 383
±82 ±46 ±45 ±46
Impatient 153 189 189 185
±43 ±25 ±29 ±27
Mixed 195 345 356 349
±73 ±35 ±31 ±34
Figure 3. Number of Coalition Members Per Leader Strategy
(settings #1, #5 and #9)
perseverance profile. We can notice that with altruistic leaders,
although many coalitions are formed, they remain very small,
indicating a possible volatility. But in scenarios with egoistic
leaders, in which there are fewer coalitions, they concentrate
more members and are possibly more stable. Moreover, with
impatient individuals not only are there few coalitions but
they are also small, because if a coalition has many impatient
members it will no longer be satisfactory to those members,
who expect very large rewards.
Table 5. Number of Members Per Coalition
Individual Leader Strategy
Profile Altruist Intermed. Egoist Mixed
Patient 7.4 29 38.4 34.4
Intermed. 10.7 28.8 34.7 32.7
Impatient 9.3 19.4 20 19.1
Mixed 8 25.1 28.3 27.1
Table 6 presents results consistent with the previous anal-
ysis. In scenarios with altruistic leaders, the investments in
coalitions tend to be lower, but higher with egoistic leaders,
since the latter give more benefits to their coalitions, as shown
in Figure 7. We can also observe from Table 6 that the standard
deviations are especially high with altruistic leaders. Since
they offer to their coalitions a smaller part of the total reward,
such coalitions have more room to receive increasing invest-
ments. Even if they are not very attractive, a few members
who remain satisfied continue to increase their investments
Figure 4. Number of Coalition Members Per Individual
Profile (settings #9, #10 and #11)
Figure 5. Number of Members / Coalition Per Leader
Strategy (settings #1, #5 and #9)
over the simulation rounds, as show in Figure 7 (blue line),
which explains the higher standard deviations. In contrast,
if the members of egoistic leaders’ coalitions continue to in-
crease their investments over many rounds, there will not be
enough reward to compensate such investments, and hence
the ‘saturation point’ is reached faster.
Moreover, it is interesting to notice that in scenarios with
impatient individuals, in which both the numbers of coalitions
and coalition members are lower, the amount of investments in
coalitions is curiously high, as also illustrated in Figure 8. This
occurs because an impatient individual gets satisfied only with
a very high reward, which means that the individual’s capital
will grow faster, thus increasing his investment capacity. This
becomes even more clear when we divide the total amount
of investments by the number of coalition members, which
is shown in Table 7 and Figures 9 and 10. The amount of
investments per coalition member is much higher in the case
of impatient individuals and it is very low in a scenario with
altruistic leaders and patient individuals. The latter indicates
that individuals do not stay too long in coalitions, since a
coalition member only stays if he is receiving good rewards
and, in this case, he would tend to increase his investment.
Finally, in scenarios with mixed individual profiles, the results
seem to be similar to those with intermediate individuals.
However, scenarios with mixed leader strategies seem to be
slightly more influenced by the presence of egoistic leaders,
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Figure 6. Number of Members / Coalition Per Individual
Profile (settings #9, #10 and #11)
so that the results are in-between the cases with exclusively
intermediate and egoistic leaders.
Table 6. Total Investments in All Coalitions
Individual Leader Strategy
Profile Altruist Intermed. Egoist Mixed
Patient 93 647 579 631
±213 ±226 ±202 ±194
Intermed. 197 587 599 567
±280 ±196 ±180 ±165
Impatient 351 566 528 510
±262 ±147 ±170 ±170
Mixed 163 668 678 672
±282 ±149 ±129 ±132
Figure 7. Total Investments Per Leader Strategy (settings #4,
#8 and #12)
Table 8 shows the average reward distributed per round.
Since each of the 1000 individuals pay 1 of tax each round, the
value that exceeds 1000 corresponds to the increase promoted
by the leader through his gain factor. As different leaders have
different gain factors, we can observe some oscillation in the
total reward, but there is no discernible correlation between
this value, the leaders’ strategies and the individuals’ profiles.
Finally, Table 9 presents the average capital that each indi-
vidual holds, which is also illustrated in Figures 11 and 12. At
first glance, we can notice that only in the case with altruistic
Figure 8. Total Investments Per Individual Profile (settings
#9, #10 and #11)
Table 7. Investment Per Coalition Member
Individual Leader Strategy
Profile Altruist Intermed. Egoist Mixed
Patient 0.46 1.45 1.22 1.36
Intermed. 0.82 1.56 1.51 1.48
Impatient 2.29 3 2.79 2.77
Mixed 0.84 1.94 1.9 1.93
leaders the average capital is greater than the initial capital:
as mentioned in Table 2, each individual receives a capital of
1000 at the beginning of the simulation. This occurs because
once an individual invests in a coalition, the amount invested
is spent on the ’campaign’ of the leader and, since in scenarios
with altruistic leaders individuals are not encouraged to invest
in coalitions, less of the capital is spent on it. We can also
observe that the available capital is lower with egoistic lead-
ers, because they encourage more investments in coalitions. It
is also lower with impatient individuals, because they invest
larger amounts in coalitions, as previously identified.
4.4 Distribution Analysis
Table 10 presents how the capital, on average, is distributed
among individuals at the end of a simulation (after 1000
rounds). Its values are different from Table 9, which shows
the average capital available, per individual, throughout a sim-
ulation. As identified previously, the average capital available
per individual is higher in a scenario with altruistic leaders
Table 8. Total Reward Distributed
Individual Leader Strategy
Profile Altruist Intermed. Egoist Mixed
Patient 1267 1319 1243 1247
±123 ±103 ±98 ±86
Intermed. 1299 1291 1250 1266
±132 ±76 ±78 ±91
Impatient 1350 1263 1205 1218
±131 ±80 ±109 ±88
Mixed 1285 1292 1255 1248
±137 ±71 ±92 ±82
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Figure 9. Investments / Coalition Member Per Leader
Strategy (settings #4, #8 and #12)
Figure 10. Investments / Coalition Member Per Individual
Profile (settings #5, #6 and #7)
and patient individuals. However, in the case of the analysis
of distribution, the focus is on the standard deviation. Firstly,
we can see that altruistic leaders promote a more egalitarian
distribution, since the respective standard deviations are much
lower. This occurs because they do not prioritize too much
their coalitions, sharing benefits more equally, as well as in-
ducing individuals to be less interested in joining coalitions.
Another effect we can observe is that in the case of mixed
leader strategies: such scenario seems to be even more un-
equal, possibly because those led by egoistic leaders benefit
even more compared to others led by altruistic leaders. In
Figure 13, we can observe that with altruistic leaders (orange
Table 9. Capital Available Per Individual
Individual Leader Strategy
Profile Altruist Intermed. Egoist Mixed
Patient 1097 874 862 846
±46 ±56 ±44 ±49
Intermed. 1074 881 852 870
±60 ±63 ±55 ±59
Impatient 1040 865 853 866
±57 ±53 ±65 ±69
Mixed 1077 841 812 816
±67 ±36 ±37 ±36
Figure 11. Capital Available / Individual Per Leader Strategy
(settings #4, #8 and #12)
Figure 12. Capital Available / Individual Per Individual
Profile (settings #1, #2 and #3)
line), most individuals hold large amounts of capital, while in
the case with mixed leaders (yellow line), many individuals
hold small amounts of capital. Lastly, we can notice that the
presence of the impatient profile implies more inequality. This
is due to the fact that impatient individuals promote a tougher
competition once they seek better rewards and the few of them
who get satisfactorily large benefits end up concentrating the
capital, as also illustrated in Figure 14.
Table 10. Distribution of Capital
Individual Leader Strategy
Profile Altruist Intermed. Egoist Mixed
Patient 1177 675 667 619
±149 ±1346 ±1418 ±1338
Intermed. 1105 707 654 702
±427 ±1879 ±1700 ±2041
Impatient 1002 699 680 710
±1198 ±2280 ±2327 ±2530
Mixed 1124 627 579 578
±316 ±1486 ±1403 ±1428
Finally, in Table 11 we can see the average distribution of
members among coalitions at the end of a simulation (after
1000 rounds). As previously indicated, coalitions are smaller
in scenarios with altruistic leaders and impatient individu-
als and larger in the presence of egoistic leaders and patient
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Figure 13. Distribution of Capital Per Leader Strategy
(settings #1, #5, #9 and #13)
Figure 14. Distribution of Capital Per Individual Profile
(settings #5, #6, #7 and #8)
individuals. However, we can observe in Table 11 that the
standard deviations are higher with altruistic leaders and tend
to be low in the case of impatient individuals. If one observes
the graphics illustrated in Figures 15 and 16, it is easier to
understand the shape of the distribution.
Even though there are many members in coalitions headed
by egoistic leaders, as shown in Table 4, we can notice in
Figure 15 that in this case (blue line) there are fewer small
coalitions (with less than 20 members) compared to other
leader strategies. On the other hand, we can also deduce that
most of these coalition members are concentrated in large
coalitions. For instance, if we consider the results from Ta-
bles 3 and 4, the average number of coalitions and coalition
members for the setting depicted in Figure 15 (egoistic leaders
and patient individuals) is respectively 12 and 474. Hence,
we can derive from this Figure that we have approximately
one single2 coalition with 170 members and another one with
100 members: this indicates that more than 50% of the 474
coalition members belong to large coalitions. This fact is in
accordance with the previous analysis, since the large coali-
tions led by egoistic leaders end up centralizing the power and
2This corresponds roughly to 8% of the total of 12 coalitions.
therefore controlling the benefits.
Lastly, Figure 16 indicates that in the case of impatient
individuals with intermediate leaders (blue line) the vast ma-
jority of coalitions are small (less than 40 members). This fact
makes sense, since in this setting there are few coalitions (10)
and also few coalition members (189), as shown in Tables 3
and 4. On the other hand, in scenarios with patient individu-
als (yellow line), small and large coalitions seem to co-exist,
which follows from the fact that in this case there are more
coalitions (15) and coalition members (447), as presented in
Tables 3 and 4.
Thus, our results apparently indicate that the individual
profile affects the number of coalitions and the number of
coalition members, as previously observed; however, it ap-
parently does not affect how those members are distributed
among small and large coalitions.
Table 11. Distribution of Members Per Coalition
Individual Leader Strategy
Profile Altruist Intermed. Egoist Mixed
Patient 9±13 30±45 37±51 33±49
Intermed. 12±19 29±32 31±36 32±35
Impatient 13±22 18±20 17±20 17±19
Mixed 9±14 24±28 26±29 26±29
Figure 15. Distribution of Members by Coalitions Per Leader
Strategy (settings #1, #5 and #9)
5. Conclusions
This work presents a simplified model of a conventional po-
litical scenario in which representatives can decide how to
distribute rewards among the population and can emerge
from coalitions that support them financially. The results
that we presented indicate that, in such context, certain lead-
ers may cause more imbalances by distributing benefits more
unequally. This intensifies the competition for rewards and
consequently stimulates more individuals to participate in
coalitions. Therefore, it would be necessary to create regula-
tions in order to minimize such imbalances. However, fairer
leaders could avoid further regulations because they make
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Figure 16. Distribution of Members by Coalitions Per
Individual Profile (settings #5, #6 and #7)
disputes for coalitions less attractive to individuals. Moreover,
impatient individuals may also promote additional imbalances.
Since they hardly get satisfied, this increases the competition
and leads to a situation in which only a few receive great
rewards and can invest ever larger amounts of capital. Their
presence along with other profiles may cause even more in-
equality, leading to a higher concentration of capital.
In the next stages of this work, we are considering further
enhancements to the model, possibly including some kind of
voting system. In this way, investments in coalitions will no
longer directly represent the likelihood of a leader’s victory,
but instead will influence the decisions of individuals over
their votes. This would allow, for example, comparing the
performance of different voting systems. Additionally, we
could include in the model the possibility of having more than
one representative per round, forming some kind of commis-
sion of representatives or even separating the population into
districts. In this case, leaders could follow more complex
strategies involving negotiation and it would be possible to
observe what kind of strategies or groups would prevail.
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